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specifically argued that "A NEW CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT."
Finally, at the very least, there is sufficient evidence to
put to the jury the question of whether a quorum of commissioners
was present at the January 15, 1985 meeting and either authorized
or ratified a new contract.
WHETHER APPELLANT'S RELIANCE WAS REASONABLE IS A QUESTION OF
FACT FOR THE JURY
Appellee's arguments that it is "reasonable to conclude"
(1) that Appellant was aware of the requirements of UCA, §7-5-5;
and

(2)

that Mr. Ehlers would not have incurred substantial

costs without a written contract in 1985, are misplaced.

In the

first place, for purposes of summary judgment, the question is
not what is reasonable to conclude, but what Appellee has
established as undisputed facts. More importantly, with respect
to § 7-5-5, the record shows that the requirements of that
section were met in this case. With respect to the
reasonableness of proceeding without a written contract, Appellee
ignores the fact that it advised Mr. Ehlers that it was very
important that he get the job done immediately and requested that
he get the "wheels rolling".

The argument also ignores the fact

that until the commencement of this lawsuit, both Mr. Ehlers and
Appellee's representatives considered the Tri-Court Complex and
the Criminal Justice Center to be the same project and,
accordingly, governed by the 1978 contract.
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Appellant hereby replies to the Brief of Appellee as
follows.
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONSE TO POINT II
THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 1978 CONTRACT
WAS CONCLUDED UPON THE FAILURE OF THE BOND ISSUE
In Point II of its argument, Appellee contends that:
Plaintiff's (i.e. Appellant's) testimony provides
undisputed material facts which substantiate the
conclusion that . . . the 1978 contract concluded upon
rejection of the bond issue in the election certified
on June 15, 1981.

(See Brief of Appellee at page 8 ) .
In support of this contention Appellee quotes portions of
Appellant's deposition testimony.
pages 5 - 7 ) .

(See Brief of Appellee at

Unfortunately, for Appellee, the quoted testimony
1

provides absolutely no support for its position that the 1978
contract had concluded.

To the contrary, said testimony clearly

bolsters Appellant's position that the 1978 contract was merely
in a state of suspension as a result of the failed bond issue.
For example, in response to Appellee's question as to
whether Appellant was aware that "the project wouldn't go forward
unless the bond issue passed," Mr. Ehlers testified
. . . I was aware that it would not go at that time,
but I was always told and aware that rati some time it
would move on . . .
(See Brief of Appellee at page 5 (quoting from Mr. Ehlers'
deposition at page 60)) (emphasis added).
Appellee repeated the question two more times and
Appellant's answers were still that the failure of the bond issue
only meant that the project would not go forward at that time.
QUESTION: Is it a fair statement that you knew that
the project at least at that point would not go forward
unless the bond issue passed?
ANSWER:

It would not go forward at that time, right.

QUESTION:
ANSWER:

When that bond issue back in 1981 was held—

Right.

QUESTION: — i f that didn't pass then it wouldn't go
immediately forward?
ANSWER:

That's right."

(See Brief of Appellee at page 6 (quoting from Mr. Ehlers'
deposition at page 60)) (emphasis added).
Obviously, contrary to Appellee's contention, Mr. Ehlers did
2

not "acknowledge [] in his testimony that the contract was
concluded upon the rejection of the bond issue."
Appellee at page 5).

(See Brief of

Mr. Ehlers' testimony makes it very clear

that he was always told and it was always his understanding that
the failure of the bond issue was a temporary set back and that
the project would eventually go forward.

Accordingly, there is

clearly a question of fact as to whether the 1978 contract was
concluded upon the failure of the bond issue.
In point of fact, the project did eventually go forward and
no amount of equivocating by Appellee with regard to which courts
were to be housed in the project or whether a jail facility or
commission chambers were to be included in the project can change
that fact.

At best, whether the Criminal Justice Center and the

Tri-Court Complex were the same project for purposes of this
contract action is a question of fact for the jury's
determination.
Appellee also goes to great length to point out to the Court
that Mr. Ehlers "acknowledged in his testimony that he was paid
an amount agreeable to him for the work he performed."
Brief of Appellee at page 6).

(See

Of course, this point has nothing

whatsoever to do with the case at bar because it involves payment
for services not included in this action.

Apparently,

Appellee

believes that it is entitled to "brownie points" because
3

Appellant was satisfied with the payment received for prior
services.

Significantly, however, Appellee also notes that

Appellant was actually entitled to receive approximately $20,000
more than he was paid for his prior services, but that the lower
amount was accepted as an accommodation to Appellee's very tight
budget.

Had Appellee treated Appellant as honorably, this

lawsuit would not have been necessary.
II.

RESPONSE TO POINT III
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE ARE
QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING WHETHER A NEW CONTRACT WAS
FORMED IN 1985
In support of its position that a new contract was not

formed in 1985, Appellee asserts that (1)

there was no meeting

of the minds sufficient to form a contract; (2)

the contract was

not reduced to writing; (3) Appellant is submitting argument to
this Court that was not made before the district court; and (4)
the 1985 contract was not authorized by formal commission action.
Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
With regard to the argument that there was no meeting of the
minds between the parties sufficient to form a new contract in
1985, Mr. Ehlers' deposition testimony makes the following very
clear:
(1) That he was contacted by Lee Semken, who at the
time was Chairman of the Carbon County Commission; and
that Mr. Semken advised him that the Criminal Justice
Cent€*r project had been revived as the Tri-Court
4

Complex and was going to go forward as they had
anticipated it would.
(See Ehlers deposition at page 61).
(2) That Mr. Semken, Mr. Ehlers, Floyd Marx and Guido
Rachiele met together on January 15, 1985 in the Carbon
County commission chambers and discussed the project
for approximately three hours.
(See Ehlers deposition at pages 62-63).
(3) That Mr. Semken advised Mr. Ehlers that it was
very important that he get his end of the job done
immediately; that a six week time frame was agreed to;
and that Semken told him to get the "wheels rolling."
(See Ehlers deposition at page 61).
Thus, at the very least, there was clearly sufficient
evidence to require a jury determination as to whether there was
a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a new contract in
1985.

See, e.g. Oberhansky v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977).
Appellee's assertion that the 1985 contract was not reduced

to writing is irrelevant and requires no further discussion.
Suffice it to say that there is nothing to indicate that this
contract was within the statute of frauds.
Likewise, Appellee's assertion that Appellant is submitting
argument to this Court not raised before the trial court requires
very little discussion.

Attached to the Brief of Appellant as

Exhibit "D" is a copy of Plaintiff's Response Memorandum To
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment at page 3 of which it was
specifically argued that "A NEW CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT."

5

Finally, there is, again, at the very least sufficient
evidence to put the question to a jury as to whether a quorum of
commissioners was present at the January 15, 1985 meeting and
either authorized or ratified a new contract.

Appellee's

assertion that the January 15, 1985 meeting was not open to the
public is irrelevant.
III.

RESPONSE TO POINT IV

WHETHER APPELLANT'S RELIANCE WAS REASONABLE IS A QUESTION
OF FACT FOR THE JURY
Appellee acknowledges that the trend is away from the
general rule that estoppel is not available against a
governmental entity, see Utah State University of Agriculture and
Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718, FN.4 (Utah
1982), and that in Utah estoppel may be applied when justice so
requires.

646 P.2d at 720.

However, Appellee asserts that estoppel is not available in
the case at bar because Appellant has had extensive dealings with
government agencies and "[i]t is certainly reasonable to conclude
that the plaintiff was aware of the requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, § 7-5-5, 1987. This is especially true when
considering Mr. Ehlers' testimony when he said 'of course, we are
waiting for the final go ahead to start drawing.'" (See Brief of
Appellee at page 10).
Whether it is "reasonable to conclude" that Appellant was
6

aware of the requirements of § 7-5-5 is, again, irrelevant to the
case at bar for two reasons.

First, as discussed above, the

requirements of that section were met in this case (or at least a
jury would be entitled to so find).

Second, even if Mr. Ehlers'

awareness of § 7-5-5 were an issue on this appeal, the question
would be whether such awareness had been established by Appellee
as an undisputed fact, not whether it was a reasonable
conclusion.

See Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finally, Appellee cites Larsen v. Wycoff, 624 P.2d 1151
(Utah 1981), for the proposition that the issue of estoppel is
governed by an objective reasonable person standard and that
because Appellant prepared a formal contract concerning his
dealings with

Appellee in 1978 "it is reasonable to conclude

that Mr. Ehlers would not proceed with incurring substantial
costs without a written contract in 1985."

(See Brief of

Appellee at page 11).
This argument ignores two important facts.

First, Appellee

had advised Mr. Ehlers that "it was a very important thing that
we get [the project] done immediately and [Appellee through its
agent Semken] asked [Mr. Ehlers if he] could handle a time
schedule of around six weeks."
61).

(See Ehlers deposition at page

Second, both Mr. Ehlers and (until the commencement of this

lawsuit) the representatives of Appellee considered the Tri-Court
7

Complex and the Criminal Justice Center to be the same project
and, accordingly, to be governed by the 1978 contract.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court take notice
of the fact that Appellee has not disputed Appellant's version of
the facts in this case.

Appellee could have, but did not,

present the affidavits of Commissioners Semken, Marx, and
Rachiele to contradict Appellant's testimony.
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure and for
that reason the contentions of the party opposing the motion must
be considered in a light most advantageous to him and all doubts
resolved in favor of permitting him to go to trial.
Receivables Inc. v. Harmon, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966).

Controlled
Appellant

respectfully submits that the case at bar presents genuine issues
of fact regarding:
(1) whether Appellee is estopped from denying it had a
contract with Appellant;
(2) whether Appellee's actions revived the 1978 contract;
and
(3) whether a new contract was entered into in 1985.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests
that the Court reverse the summary judgment granted in favor of
Appellee and remand this case for a full trial on the merits.
8
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